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Summary:  The Hungarian national economy, struggling with public finance debts, low 
efficiency in budgetary policy and a weak control potential, had reached a 
state of crisis by the middle of the 2000s, which deepened further by the time 
of the 2007-2008 crisis. From 2010 onwards, as opposed to the conventional 
crisis management method of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Union, which was based on budgetary restrictions, adjustments were 
made to the budget. In 2013, the Hungarian central bank, which did not use 
conventional crisis management instruments either, joined in, thus becoming an 
institutional part of the state financial system. It was confirmed that the central 
bank can help fiscal consolidation and growth potential while still being able to 
preserve its independence. Conditions were established for the – non-conventional 
– rules of both fiscal and monetary interventions within the highest level national 
regulatory framework of the law, compliance with which is ensured by legislative 
and institutional guarantees.
Keywords:   fiscal and monetary policy, crisis management, state financial consolidation, rule-
based budget, European Union, IMF, Hungary
1.  INTRODUCTION: IN THE SHADOW OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT 
The crisis that erupted in 2007–2008 seriously affected the business and public finance 
sectors globally, which gave rise to heightened expectations for the reconstruction of the state 
and rationalisation of its operation. A strong demand for helping the state appeared especially 
in the Eastern and Central European countries, which was partly an inheritance stemming 
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from the paternalistic practice of Soviet-type economic plan periods, and partly because these 
countries had revitalised their economies with western capital since the end of the 1980s, but 
as a consequence of the crisis, western investments dried up both in terms of working capital 
investments and state debt financing. Hungary became one of the main “reference countries” 
for these disadvantageous processes, becoming practically unable to operate its public finan-
ces by the end of the 2000s. In the autumn of 2006, the government at the time announced 
a gigantic budget restriction program through a convergence path adjustment package to mi-
tigate the current budget deficit, which was nearing 10 percent, and the state debt, which 
exceeded 80 percent of GDP1. This was aimed both at increasing the tax burdens of internal 
residents and at reducing the state expenditure, as well as influencing them. As a result of the 
austerity measures, the financial balance had improved to a certain extent, but the performan-
ce of the Hungarian economy and the aggregate financial demand had significantly fallen by 
the autumn of 2008, when the financial crisis also hit Europe. As a result of the inaccessibility 
of western financing markets and the uncertainty factors, Hungary, which financed its growth 
and precarious financial balance from outside, fell into a de facto sovereign default, which the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Central Bank tried to remedy 
with a 25 billion dollar rapid loan, thus avoiding the condition of de jure sovereign default. 
Until 2010, the budget policy had been characterised by the enforcement of restriction mecha-
nisms that were expected in exchange for foreign loans. After 2010, through a budgeting pra-
ctice moving towards the sharing of public burdens by increasing the taxes imposed on forei-
gn-owned, well-capitalised enterprises and concurrently reducing the tax burdens of internal 
residents, they were able to drive the budget deficit to GDP ratio down to below 3 percent, and 
have been able to maintain this rate ever since, thus achieving fiscal2 consolidation. Increasing 
the solvent demand, according to the Keynesian model, and the state’s active role in influen-
cing the economy can, in terms of fiscal instruments, ensure stable state financing positions. 
In the period between 2006 and 2013, until consolidation began in 2013, the occurrence of 
sovereign default in Hungary could be described in five economic dimensions: 
•   the central budget is unable to function, debt service and state public services remain 
unsettled,
•   there is a chronic social insurance deficit, especially in the pension insurance system, 
which results in a shortfall or significant reduction of pension payments, 
•   widespread bankruptcy of banks and companies, which makes the operating environ-
ment uncertain; bank deposits become inaccessible, production declines and a huge 
number of companies go bankrupt,
•   settlement municipalities that are part of the local system of state finances declare ban-
kruptcy all over the country, public services cease, settlements are unable to provide 
public utilities and public administration services, and social conflicts arise, 
•   as a result of large-scale insolvency of families indebted in foreign currency and masses of 
people experiencing more difficult living circumstances, social tranquility disintegrates.
1  Reaching 2500 billion forints, amounting to 1 billion US dollars if calculated at an exchange rate of 250 HUF to USD.
2  Hungary was relieved of the European Union’s Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2013.
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Complete (de facto and de jure) sovereign default may have resulted from any of the pro-
blems becoming unmanageable in the long run. The Hungarian government had to eliminate 
the problems and achieve consolidation at the same time, move towards sectoral and macroe-
conomic stability and even make preparations for economic growth.
2.  THEORY OF FISCAL INCAPACITY
State capacity is defined by Hanson and Sigman3 in three dimensions: 1) The state’s extra-
ctive capacity, 2) The state’s coercive capacity, 3) The state’s administrative capacity. In other 
words, the state needs a revenue to maintain its operation, its internal security forces and a 
legal order to enforce its will (to enforce its coercive capacity), and as a third factor it must 
deliver public services in exchange for retained revenues. The extractive and coercive capaci-
ties ultimately help the state carry out its function (administrate capacity). Bardhan defines 
it as a requirement4 whereby “the state has to be strong enough to protect property rights 
and other institutions underpinning markets and contracts”. By 2007–2008, the incapacity 
of enterprises operating in the administrative area of states had become so serious that it 
weakened state operation. As a consequence of the economic anarchy, the state’s revenue so-
urces dried up and in addition, consolidation obligations arose which caused the quality and 
quantity of state-provided public services to decrease. Owing to the deepening social distrust 
in governments, the state was only able to operate in a restricted way, which meant that the 
economic expansion of the neoliberal market economy that had been maintained for decades 
had weakened in the United States by 2007, then also in Europe by the autumn of 2008. 
The 2007–2008 crisis was equally caused by uncurbed market (corporate) automatisms, the 
difficulties of information flow between competitors (information asymmetries) and unco-
ordinated production. The lack of coordination in the market actors’ activity dating back to 
the beginning of the 1970s increasingly manifested itself in commercial banking activity. The 
large-scale lending to secondary debtors that financial institutions predominantly focused 
on when granting loans generated system-level repayment problems over time with market 
saturation and the slowdown of the economic upheaval. These remained hidden for years, 
however, because of the securitisation processes5, and the lack of thorough risk assessments 
by credit rating agencies. While the 1929-33 crisis can be best expressed as an overproduction 
process in the material sphere, the root cause of the collapse which occurred in 2007-2008 can 
be expressed as an over-lending process. Lending processes, which were not coordinated by 
the state and were less and less controlled and regulated, resulted in a banking crisis, which 
then led to the crisis of the capital- and credit-intensive production sector, and ultimately to 
that of the public financing system.
3  Hanson, J. K.; Sigman, R., Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research. APSA 2011 
Annual Meeting Paper.
4  Bardhan, P., State and Development, The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 54, 
No. 3, 2016, pp. 862–892, p. 866.
5  Transforming irrecoverable bank receivables into securities, then buying and selling them in the capital market. See Bujtár Zs., 
Az árnyékbankrendszer és az értékpapírosítás az Egyesült Államokban (The shadow banking system and securitisation in the United 
States), Controller Info, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2016, pp. 37–41.
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In all the four institutional groups classified according to Rodrik,6 hence in the institutions 
ensuring the protection of property rights and the regulation of markets, and also in the ones 
serving stability and legitimisation, the tasks were carried out incompletely and with disrup-
tions. As a result of market disturbances, the business value started to decrease both at the 
corporate and household level. The authorities expected to regulate market operation and the 
actors of stabilisation had already failed, so the society’s dislike for government operation was 
growing, which meant that their confidence in the government largely weakened all over the 
world, and consequently the system of the neoliberal market economy did not operate smo-
othly. After the British mortgage markets and subsequently the economy of the United States 
had weakened, the spreading crisis exerted the strongest influence in the European region, in 
particular in the post-soviet countries and in the countries of the European Union which had 
a weaker position or had entered the EU later than Hungary.7
3.  CRISIS MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY – RESTRICTION OR 
EXPANSION? 
While recovering from a crisis, it is justified that the economic policy aims to change the 
practice implemented before the crisis, and it should steer the national economy towards eco-
nomic growth and financial balance. After the crisis, a period of economic reflection started 
all over the world, with special focus on the practical aspects of crisis management. Without 
claims of being exhaustive, special mention should be made of the works by Blanchard, O. and 
Leigh, D. (2013), Borio (2012), Koo (2014), Buti-Carnot (2012), Schick (2013), Blundell-Wi-
gnall, A., Atkinson-Hoon L. (2009), as well as Singh, Dalvinder and LaBrosse (2012). In the 
course of resolving the deadlock, the state took up credit and employed fiscal measures incre-
asing the revenue side and also decreasing the expenditure side of the budget, which may be 
considered a common crisis management technique of the preceding decades and even of the 
years after the breakout of the crisis. Implementing a series of austerity measures, in return 
for the credit provided by the IMF and the World Bank, was a crisis management method 
frequently followed globally. In the case of Greece and Hungary, which had reached a critical 
level by 2008, it became a required crisis management method to apply restrictive measures in 
exchange for the international credit facilities received. Other countries in the Mediterranean 
region also used this kind of crisis management method, whereas in Hungary an economic po-
licy emerged from 2010 onwards through the establishment of the new Fundamental Law and 
laws on public funds that basically focused on the sharing of public burdens, the termination 
of external indebtedness, the acquisition of state property, state regulations and the stren-
gthening of control. Regarding international companies, telecommunication enterprises and 
banks, the state imposed an additional burden adjusted to their taxation power in the mostly 
foreign, well-capitalised sectors, whereas for internal residents it used the institution of tax 
reduction, mainly for income type taxes (personal income tax, corporate tax on profits). As a 
6  Rodrik, D., Trade Policy Reform as Institutional Reform. In. Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations, 
Edited by Bernard Hoekman, Harvard University Handbook 2000, and Rodrik, D.; Subramanian, A., The Primacy of Institutions, 
Finance and Development, Vol. 40, No. 30, 2003, pp. 31–34.
7  The states in the Mediterranean region, Ireland and in the former Central European Comecon countries. 
13
Csaba Lentner, EXCERPTS ON NEW HUNGARIAN STATE FINANCES FROM LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL...
consequence of the commercial turnover expansion generated by the increase of incomes and 
the solvent demand, namely by the additional turnover tax revenue, and by the reduction of 
the mostly parallel public service capacities, the Hungarian economy was channelled towards 
budget consolidation.
As an essential element in the crisis management of Hungarian public funds, in the first 
phase priority was given to the regulations preventing indebtedness, and they were incorpo-
rated at the highest level into the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The emerging new public 
funds management is rule-based, which is kept within the limits by a strong control mechani-
sm. Managing public funds economically, creating a budgetary balance and maintaining it in 
the long run, and reducing state debts are such high priority economic goals in Hungary that 
the most fundamental principles and rules aiming at their implementation were set out in the 
Fundamental Law. Stable state finances provide a sound basis for creating and maintaining a 
firm foundation for economic growth. On the other hand, budgetary authorisation and the 
underlying legislative background are the results of an independent economic policy. Hun-
gary’s crisis management policy strayed from the restriction-based proposals of the IMF and 
the World Bank, and in many cases it was in direct contradiction with the normative rules of 
the European Union. The Hungarian changes were rapid, even though it is a fact that in the 
European region Hungary and Greece were hit most severely by the crisis that erupted in the 
autumn of 2008. The impacts of the Hungarian fiscal change and those of the Greek tightening 
policy (characteristic of the whole of the Mediterranean region) were significantly different.
•   Hungary repaid the IMF loans as early as 2013–2014, while Greece has not, as of yet, 
been able to pay them back. 
•   In 2013, Hungary, after having adopted an economic policy that deviated from the EU 
standards, was relieved of the European Union’s Excessive Deficit Procedure, whereas 
Greece has not yet been able to end the procedure up to this date. 
•   At the end of 2017, the unemployment rate in Hungary was 4 percent, while it was ne-
arly 25 percent in Greece. 
•   The cumulated growth in real GDP in comparison to 2000 is 140 percent in Hungary, 
and 95 percent in Greece, and consequently, restricted reproduction processes have re-
mained in place to this day. 
•   In Hungary, the net external debt as a percentage of GDP has decreased from 60 percent 
to 20 percent compared to 2010, while in Greece it has grown from 80 percent to 140 
percent. 
•   The rate of non-performing corporate loans was 15 percent in Hungary in 2013, a num-
ber which has shrunk to 5 percent8, while during the same period in the partner country 
chosen as a reference country this rate grew from 30 to 40 percent. 
•   Although fiscal adjustment is successful in Greece and the annual 15 percent GDP-pro-
portionate budget deficit of 2009 had decreased to 0 percent by the end of 2016, the 
measures based on restrictions drove the Greek GDP down by 25 percent.9
8  Source: Hungarian Banking Association, special data communication, 2017.
9  The shortfall from the potential level is 25 percent, while in the Mediterranean region as a whole it is 18 percent on average. 
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Key macro-economic data in Hungary and Greece, 2008–2016
  2008 2009 2010 2016
  GR HU GR HU GR HU GR HU
GDP growth (%) -0.3 0.9 -4.3 -6.6 -5.5 0.7 -0.2 2.2
Unemployment rate (%) 7.8 7.8 9.6 10.0 12.7 11.2 23.5 5.1
Government debt to GDP, % 109.4 71.0 126.7 77.2 146.2 79.7 180.8 73.9
Government deficit to GDP, % -10.2 -3.7 -15.1 -4.5 -11.2 -4.5 0.5 -1.9
Inflation rate (%) 4.2 6.1 1.2 4.2 4.7 4.9 -0.8 0.4
Source: Eurostat, Worldbank
4.  LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF PUBLIC 
FINANCES IN HUNGARY
Hungarian crisis management is based on political and social authorisation10 and on the 
legislative regulation based on it, which was elevated to the constitutional legislative level in 
2011.  In the Fundamental Law of Hungary,11 the articles on public funds and local govern-
ments set out as a cardinal provision that the Parliament may not adopt an act on the central 
budget as a result of which the state debt would exceed half of Gross Domestic Product. Being 
aware of the actual data and the overspending practice in the period before 2010, the provisi-
on says that as long as the state debt exceeds half of Gross Domestic Product, the Parliament 
may only adopt an act on the central budget that provides for state debt reduction in propor-
tion to GDP. Any derogation from these rules may only be allowed accompanied by a special 
legal order and to the extent necessary to mitigate the consequences of the circumstances 
triggering the special legal order, or, in case of an enduring and significant national economic 
recession, to the extent necessary to restore the balance of the national economy.
It is an essential element that the government is obliged to implement the central budget 
in a lawful and reasonable manner, managing public funds effectively while ensuring transpa-
rency, during which, with the exceptions defined in the case of a special legal order, it is not 
allowed to take a loan nor undertake a financial commitment that would result in state debt 
exceeding half of GDP. It is a transitional rule that as long as the state debt exceeds half of Gro-
ss Domestic Product, with the exceptions defined in the case of a special legal order, no such 
borrowing may be contracted and no such financial commitment may be undertaken in the 
course of the implementation of the central budget that would result in an increase, as compa-
red to the previous year, of the ratio of state debt in relation to GDP. As long as state debt ex-
ceeds half of GDP, rules restricting any investigation by the constitutional court are enforced. 
Such special rules apply to the acts on the central budget, the implementation of the central 
budget, central taxes, duties and contributions, customs duties and the central conditions for 
10  In 2010, the winning political forces in the parliamentary elections obtained a two-third majority and they have been able to 
maintain this balance of power continuously. Thus it has become a smooth process in Parliament to adopt and implement the 
laws intended to reduce state debt, which was made a central issue of Hungarian state operation.
11  Art. 36 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Hungarian Gazette 2011/43, 2013/55, 2013/163, 2016/96.
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local taxes. The Constitutional Court may only review such acts pertaining to public finances 
in connection with the rights to life and human dignity, to the protection of personal data, to 
freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion, or to the rights regarding Hungarian citizenship 
and it may only annul these acts for the violation of these rights. The Constitutional Court is 
entitled to annul the acts on the above subject-matters without limitation if the procedural 
requirements for the creation and promulgation of the acts have not been met according to the 
provisions laid down in the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
The subsystem of local governments is considered as part of the public finances, and this 
subsystem is regulated so that in order to keep the state budget balance, the borrowing of 
the local government, the rate of which is specified in legislation, or other commitments un-
dertaken by the local government may be subject to conditions or the government’s consent. 
Zéman emphasises that the enterprises operated by local governments are also determining 
parts of the local government sector, therefore their balanced operation is important for ensu-
ring high standards for the population. To this end, it is indispensable to have a stable source 
structure and control.12
The chapter of the Fundamental Law on public funds and the acts relating to public funds, 
in particular the cardinal acts, make up a closed unit. They ensure Hungary’s financial sta-
bility and behind this also the responsible management13 of public funds and public assets. 
Parliament created the Stability Act14 for the implementation of the Fundamental Law in or-
der to ensure the country’s financial stability and budgetary sustainability, facilitate the inde-
pendent study of the justification of the Act on the Central Budget and the reduction of state 
debts. This cardinal law includes rules on the calculation of state debt and rules restricting its 
growth. Furthermore, it details the basic rules of operation of the sharing of public burdens, 
the pension system and the Fiscal Council. The Fiscal Council, acting as a body, participates in 
drafting the Act on the Central Budget and in the control of the provisions pertaining to the 
extent of state debt. During the performance of its activity the Council is only subject to the 
Fundamental Law and the acts. The Council members form their opinions independently and 
are also independent of one another in the representation of their standpoints.15
The balance of public finances and the guarantees of a transparent, efficient and controlla-
ble management of public funds are governed by Act CXCV of 2011. Preserving local govern-
ment traditions and enforcing the basic principles defined in the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government, Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on the local governments of Hungary guarantees the 
right of local voters to self-government, the contribution of local governments to the imple-
12  Hegedűs, Sz.; Zéman, Z., Tőkeszerkezeti elméletek érvényesülésének vizsgálata a hazai önkormányzati tulajdonú gazdasági társaságok 
körében (Study of the Enforcement of Theories on Capital Structure among Hungarian Businesses in Local Government 
Ownership), Statisztikai Szemle, Vol. 94, No. 10, 2016, pp. 1032–1049., and: Zéman Z.; Tóth A., Az önkormányzatok és közüzemi 
vállalatok teljesítményértékelése (Performance evaluation of local governments and public utility companies), Adózási pénzügytan 
és államháztartási gazdálkodás (Taxation Financing and Public Finance Management). Lentner Cs., ed., Nemzeti Közszolgálati 
Egyetem (National Public Service University), Budapest, 2015, pp. 829–853.
13  An interesting aspect is the management of state-owned enterprises which may be also subject to European corporate 
governance provisions. For further details see: Kecskés A., A felelős társaságirányítás európai rendszere (The European System of 
Corporate Governance) Európai Jog (European Law) Vol. 16, No. 3. 2016, pp. 28–38.
14  Act CXCIV of 2011, Hungarian Gazette, 2011/164.
15  Regarding the operation of the Fiscal Council see: Kovács Á., A Költségvetési Tanács a Magyar Alaptörvényben – Vázlat az 
intézményfejlődésről és az európai uniós gyakorlatról (Kovács Á, The Fiscal Council in the Fundamental Law – Sketch on Institutional 
Development and European Union Practice), Pénzügyi Szemle (Financial Review), Vol. 61, No. 3, 2016, pp. 320–337.
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mentation of state goals and at the same time also the strengthening of local communities’ 
self-support ability and the creation of the conditions required for local self-government.
The Hungarian Parliament, exercising its budgetary right,16 annually approves a budget 
plan proposed by the government and entitled Act on Hungary’s Central Budget. At the end of 
the fiscal year, the government compiles the Draft Act on Final Accounts, which is reviewed by 
the State Audit Office, then the Parliament discusses it and creates the Act on Final Accounts.
The basic rules pertaining to national assets are included in the Fundamental Law and in 
the act adopted for its implementation, Act CXCVI of 2011 on National Assets.17 The revenues of 
public finances provide the funds that may be used for expenditures related to the performan-
ce of state tasks and their financing. The implementation of public duties requires not only 
funding, but also other asset elements, such as, in particular buildings, structures, vehicles, 
machines, equipment, intellectual products, property rights and reserves. Management with 
a budgetary-financial approach, which builds on revenues and expenditures, is strongly linked 
to asset management with an inventory approach, since the use of and return on assets also 
satisfies public needs. The Fundamental Law provides that “the property of the State and local 
governments shall constitute national assets. The management and protection of national as-
sets shall aim at serving public interest, meeting common needs and preserving natural reso-
urces, as well as at taking into account the needs of future generations.” The Fundamental Law 
provides enhanced protection for public funds and national assets, and lays down guarantees 
for their responsible and transparent management.
The fundamental function of national assets is to ensure the performance of public tasks. 
The Act on National Assets also defines the concept of the public task. A public task is a state 
or a local government task defined in law, which is performed by the obliged party for public 
interest in compliance with the requirements and conditions defined in law, including the 
provision of public services for the population, tasks of public interest arising from the state’s 
obligations undertaken in international agreements, and the provision of the infrastructure 
needed for the completion of such tasks. The national assets shall be managed in a responsible 
manner for their intended purpose.
The uninterrupted operation of a state budget18 converted into a rule-based budget is en-
sured by additional laws. The purpose of the Act on the Rules of Taxation is to provide a uniform 
regulation for the rights and obligations of tax payers and the tax authorities in order to en-
sure the legality and the effectiveness of the procedure. The tax payers and the tax authori-
ties may exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations according to the Act on the Rules of 
Taxation. It is through this mechanism that the acts on taxes are observed and the subsidies 
are disbursed. So the procedure of the revenues flowing into and the expenditure flowing out 
of public finances is governed by the Act on the Rules of Taxation. The acts on taxes (personal 
income tax, value added tax, corporate profit tax, etc.) set out detailed rules for the individual 
types of taxes. The operative fiscal processes, as mentioned before, are managed by the Natio-
nal Tax and Customs Administration.
16  Kecskés A., Inside and Outside the Province of Jurisprudence, Rechtstheorie, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2015, pp. 465–479.
17  Kecskés A., A szuverén alapok jogi háttere és nemzetgazdasági szerepvállalása (Legal Background and National Economic Role of 
Sovereign Funds), Pro Futuro, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016, pp 151–169, p. 166.
18  Kovács Á., Rule-Based Budgeting: The Road to Budget Stability. The Hungarian Solution, Polgári Szemle (Civic Review), Vol. 13, 
Special Issue, 2017, pp. 39–63.
17
Csaba Lentner, EXCERPTS ON NEW HUNGARIAN STATE FINANCES FROM LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL...
The control over state assets and public funds, deriving from the Fundamental Law, appe-
ars in the Act on the State Audit Office.19 Chapter VIII of the Public Finances Act distinguishes 
three levels of state control: control by the State Audit Office, control by the government and 
the internal control of public finances. Funds are supplied to entities operating under the 
budgetary order and the public funds are managed through the State Treasury, whereas state 
debts are managed through the State Debt Management Centre belonging to the organisational 
structure of the Hungarian State Treasury. 
5.  LEGAL REGULATION AND PRACTICE OF CENTRAL BANKING 
ACTIVITY 
Article 41 of the Fundamental Act, included in the chapter on public funds, stipulates that 
the National Bank of Hungary is the central bank of Hungary responsible for monetary policy 
in the manner specified in a separate cardinal act (the Central Bank Act of 2011 and then of 
2013). The primary objective of the National Bank of Hungary is to achieve and maintain price 
stability. Furthermore, without prejudice to its primary objective, it supports the economic 
policy of the government, using the monetary policy instruments at its disposal; it is declared 
that the central bank is an institutional part of the system of public finances, and with this, 
the responsibility for the entire national economy was codified in the Fundamental Law.20
The National Bank of Hungary is a member of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB). The National Bank of Hungary and the members of its decision-making bodies are in-
dependent in carrying out the tasks and meeting the obligations conferred upon them by law, 
and may not seek or take instructions from the government, the institutions and bodies of the 
European Union, the governments of its Member States and any other bodies, other than the 
European Central Bank.21 The government and all other organisations respect this principle 
and do not seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the National Bank 
of Hungary in the performance of their tasks. The Governor of the National Bank of Hungary 
is required to report to Parliament in writing and orally.
The Governor of the National Bank of Hungary reports to Parliament on the activities and 
monetary policy of the National Bank of Hungary on an annual basis. He makes a written re-
port to the Parliamentary Standing Committee in charge of economic affairs on a six-monthly 
basis on the activities of the National Bank of Hungary in the past six months, with content 
corresponding to his annual report. The National Bank of Hungary must be consulted regar-
ding the drafts of decisions and legislative provisions related to the tasks of the National Bank 
19  Act LXVI of 2011 Hungarian Gazette 2011/51. For a more detailed overview of the regulatory framework of the State Audit 
Office, see Domokos L., Az Állami Számvevőszék jogosítványainak kiteljesedése az új közpénzügyi szabályozás tükrében (Extension 
of the powers of the State Audit Office with regard to the new public funds regulations), Pénzügyi Szemle (Public Finance 
Quarterly), Vol. 62, No. 2, 2016, pp. 299–319.
20  Below, the study confirms that (through fiscal policy) the government was only able to stabilise public finances, trigger economic 
growth, and achieve a positive change in competitiveness with the help of the monetary policy tools of the National Bank of 
Hungary. 
21  Kecskés A., Kihívások az árnyékbankrendszer jogi szabályozásában (Challenges in the legal regulation of shadow banking system) 
Miskolci Jogi Szemle (Miskolc Law Review), Vol. 11, No. 2, 2016, pp. 42–54, p. 51.
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of Hungary and the operation of the financial system. When the government has approved 
the budget, the Minister for the National Economy informs the National Bank of Hungary of 
the draft bill for the central budget without delay. The National Bank of Hungary is entitled 
to send their opinion on the draft directly to the Minister. This opinion is presented at the 
Budget Committee meeting by the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary. However, the 
presented opinion does not restrict the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary from freely 
exercising his rights as a member of the Budget Committee.
In 2013, central banking mechanisms took a new course in Hungary: this is manifest 
in the reduction of the base rate, the refashioning of the monetary policy instruments, the 
narrowing of the interest rate corridor, the Funding for Growth Scheme,22 and the Self-Finan-
cing Programme to help public finance management.23
After 2013, the central bank’s new course achieved its goal in the refinancing efforts: it 
provided small and medium-size enterprises as well as agricultural producers with access to 
the resources required for their development, and this was expressly aimed at supporting the 
government’s fiscal policy, as it resulted in economic growth, an increase in domestic solvent 
demand and in new value. In terms of the cumbersome management of public debt, the acti-
ons taken to promote domestic financing through lower rates also benefited the country’s 
financial stability. Through these refinancing actions, the central bank, which obviously does 
not generate public funds (it is not subject to the Act on Public Finances, it does not collect 
taxes, and it does not grant aid constituting public funds), nevertheless became part of the 
system of Hungarian public finances. Thus, after more than a decade of intermission, the real 
sector of the economy, which had been eliminated by 1995, and the (partial) refinancing of 
public debt, which had been terminated by 2000 in the course of the lead-up to the accession 
to the European Union, were essentially restored in 2013.24
6.  OUTCOMES OF COORDINATION IN HUNGARIAN PUBLIC 
FINANCES
With the legislative regulation of the coordination of fiscal and monetary mechanisms, 
and with the help of practical mechanisms implemented in this spirit, Hungary successfully 
stabilised the public finance sector and triggered growth. The crisis management carried out 
by the increasingly active central bank played a pivotal role in this process.25  
22  HUF 3500 billion was allocated to this scheme, essentially for long-term investment loans at low (refinancing) rates, similar to 
the Funding for Lending scheme of the Bank of England and the Quantitative Easing programme run by FED. 
23  In the framework of the central bank’s Self-Financing Programme, by “channelling” domestic commercial banks towards the 
market of government securities, the central bank increased the domestic ratio within public debt, and thus cut the country’s 
external exposure.
24  It is important to emphasize that this was justified by successful crisis management and the similar actions taken in the advanced 
world (FED, BoE and then the ECB). 
25  In the spirit of the Fundamental Law, and other cardinal statutory regulations regulating public finances. 
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When Hungary was hit by the 2008 crisis,26 it was vulnerable and defenceless. One reason 
for this, among others, was that the Constitution in force before 2011 did not contain any 
chapter on public finances; in other words, there was no constitutional rule, nor a guarantee 
enforcing compliance, for the limitation of excessive sovereign indebtedness. Public finance 
control was inefficient, and the central bank’s policy only focused on anti-inflationary obje-
ctives.27 A comparison of operation before and after 2013 confirms the beneficial impacts of 
proactive central banking on fiscal positions.
Every year between 2002 and 2006, Hungary’s budget balance showed a deficit amounting 
to 6-8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and even in 2007 the deficit well exceeded 
4 percent. The reorganisation of public finances started in 2011, when the balance calcula-
ted according to the then valid methodology of the European Union (EA95) suddenly fell to 
4 percent of GDP (primarily due to the single budget revenues from the transformation of 
the pension fund scheme). Since 2012, the budget deficit has remained below 3 percent of 
GDP according to every EU-compatible indicator. The deficit decrease was due, in part, to the 
improvement of the primary balance (net of the interest balance), and to falling net interest 
costs after 2013.
The National Bank of Hungary’s refashioned monetary policy28 contributed considera-
bly to the reduction of the interest costs of the budget through cutting government security 
yields. 29  According to the National Bank of Hungary’s estimate, between 2013 and 2015, 
the interest reduction impact represented about 1 percent of GDP, and this was due, among 
other things, to the easing cycles, to the central bank’s focused programmes, in particular, the 
Self-Financing Programme,30 and to the consistent and appropriate communication of the es-
sence of the monetary policy. 31 Due to a gradual repricing of the sovereign debt, interest costs 
are expected to continue falling in the future, and the annual saving on interest may amount 
to as much as 1.7 percent of GDP, which translates to HUF 600-700 billion. In addition, re-
duction in the central bank’s interest costs should also be taken into consideration, as since 
26  For more on this on this topic and on successful crisis management, see: Matolcsy, Gy.: Egyensúly és növekedés (Balance and 
Growth), Kairosz, Budapest, 2015.
27  The State Audit Office did not have sufficient powers to control public utility service provider companies in municipal ownership. 
Thus, due to legal disorganization, the findings of SAO investigations remained without any consequences. 
28  Lehmann, K.; Palotai D. and Virág B., eds., A magyar út -célzott jegybanki politika (The Hungarian Way - Targeted Central Banking 
Policy). National Bank of Hungary, Budapest, 2017. Let us add that change in monetary policies is a general trend throughout the 
world. About the same on a theoretical level: Tatay T., A központi banki feladatok változása (Changes in Central Banking Duties). 
In: Kálmán J. (ed.), Állam – válság – pénzügyek: A pénzügyi piac szabályozásának és felügyeletének aktuális kérdései (State – 
Crisis – Finances: Current Issues in the Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Market), Batthyány Lajos Szakkollégium, 
Győr 2015.pp. 53-76, and Tatay T., A központi bankok változó szerepe (The Changing Role of Central Banks), Polgári Szemle, Vol. 
11, No. 1–3, 2015, pp. 90–102.
29  The macro-economic data included in Chapter VI are presented on the basis of the special data issues and official statistics of the 
National Bank of Hungary. 
30  Kolozsi P. P. and Hoffmann M.: A külső sérülékenység csökkentése monetáris politikai eszközökkel - A Magyar Nemzeti Bank jegybanki 
eszköztárának megújítása (2014–2016) (Reducing External Vulnerability by Monetary Policy Means – Renewal of the Hungarian 
National Bank’s Central Banking Instruments), Pénzügyi Szemle Vol. 61, No. 1, 2016a, pp. 9-34; Kolozsi P. P. and Hoffmann 
M. (eds.) Az Önfinanszírozási program első két éve (The First Two Years of the Self-Financing Programme), 2016b; Kolozsi P. P.: 
Stabilabb és olcsóbb finanszírozást hozhatnak az MNB új eszközei (The New Instruments Used by the National Bank of Hungary May 
Result in More Stable and Cheaper Financing), 2014. URL= https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/kolozsi-pal-peter-jegybanki-eszkozok.
pdf. Accessed on 09 November 2017.
31  National Bank of Hungary: Félidős jelentés 2013–2016, (Interim report, 2013-2016) 2016. URL= https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/
felidos-jelentes-2013-2016-hun-0303.pdf. Accessed 09 November 2017.
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the start of quantitative easing, the National Bank of Hungary’s cumulative interest savings 
have reached nearly 2 percent of GDP (representing an additional amount of more than HUF 
600 billion).32 Moreover, interest cuts boosted domestic investments and consumption, while 
the Funding for Growth Programme launched in 2013 provided direct assistance to financing 
small and medium-sized businesses.
Hungary’s sovereign debt amounted to 55 percent of GDP in 2002, this ratio rose to 65 
percent in 2007, and to 80 percent in 2010. It is important to see that while in 2004 slightly 
more than 25 percent of the sovereign debt was denominated in foreign currency, in 2008 this 
ratio was already 40 percent, and by 2010 it rose above 50 percent. The year of the adoption 
of the Fundamental Law was thus a milestone in this respect, too. Up to 2011, government 
debt continued to increase significantly, and then debt started to fall: moving from the 80 
percent ratio by 2016 it fell just below 75 percent of GDP, and this can be considered a major 
achievement due to the “inertia” of debt. Meanwhile, the ratio of Foreign exchange (FX) debt 
to the total sovereign debt dropped from above 50 percent to around 20-25 percent, which 
means that indebtedness in FX was practically halved, and exposure in FX as well as the exter-
nal vulnerability of the entire Hungarian economy was considerably reduced (these steps were 
achieved through the charge-off of household FX loans).33
In 2010, the monthly inflation rate was around 4-5 percent. Following the year of the adop-
tion of the Fundamental Law (2011), due in large part to international developments and to 
utility cost cuts, the inflation rate, after an initial slight rise, fell considerably and finally prac-
tically tapered off. This enabled the National Bank of Hungary to launch its above-mentioned 
easing cycle as early as mid-2012, which resulted, later on, in a changed global economic envi-
ronment, and in the successful avoidance of deflation.34 
Prior to the adoption of the Fundamental Law, Hungary’s growth data remained moder-
ate: while between 2002 and 2005, Hungary’s GDP increased faster than the average of the 
Visegrád Group35 (4 percent to 2-3 percent of the regional average), between 2006 and 2010, 
it typically remained below the value of the regional competitors. As a combined effect of fiscal 
stabilization and the breakthrough in monetary policy, Hungary started to re-establish itself 
in 2013: the growth rate has been significantly exceeding the average of the Euro Area, steadily 
remaining in the 2-4 percent range. According to the forecasts of the April 2017 Convergence 
Programme, the pace of economic growth is set at 4 percent in Hungary between 2017 and 
2021, which represents a substantive rise even in a medium-term comparison.36 The central 
bank’s Funding for Growth Programme and base rate cuts boosted economic growth. The rate 
of economic growth would have been 1.2, 2.6, 2.2 and 1.7 percent without intervention and 
it was 2.1, 4, 3.1 and 2.2 percent as a result of the central bank’s intervention in 2013, 2014, 
32  Felcser D.; Soós G. D.; Váradi B., A kamatcsökkentési ciklus hatása a magyar makrogazdaságra és a pénzügyi piacokra (Impact of 
Easing on Hungarian Macro-economy and on the Financial Markets), Hitelintézeti Szemle, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2015, pp. 39–59.
33  Lentner Cs.: Taxonomic Overview of the Evolution and Consolidation of Household Lending, Vol. 60. No. 3, 2015, pp. 305–318.
34  Without cutting the central bank base rate, the inflation rate would have dropped to -1.7 percent, representing deflation; the 
actual figure was, however, -0.1 percent. By 2016, a deflation rate of – 1.5 percent could have been achieved, while in reality a 0.4 
percent inflation was recorded. 
35  Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia.
36  Government of Hungary: The Convergence Programme of Hungary, 2017–2021, 2017 URL= https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/
info/files/2017-european-semester-convergence-programme-hungary-hu-2.pdf. Accessed on 09 November 2017.
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2015 and 2016, respectively. The growth rates generated by the central bank also indirectly 
improved the tax and duty revenues of the government budget, and consequently, the general 
government balance, by approximately 0.3-0.4 percent per annum.
As a result of the low and moderated inflationary environment created by the central bank, 
the longer-term investment loans bearing lower than market rates, the cheaper government 
debt financing due to the low interest rate trajectory, and lending to businesses and house-
holds at lower rates benefit the complex objectives of the national economy and the society. 
Leaving the pre-2013 single purpose – single instrument (exclusively anti-inflationary) policy 
behind, the central bank has again become a propelling force in public finances, in the corpo-
rate environment, and in household economy. The assignment of several mandates to the cen-
tral bank not only makes the central bank a supporter of the financial policy of the fiscal ad-
ministration, and involves it in economic policy as a proactive contributor, but also enables it 
to serve the public good in the broad sense of the term. Capitalising on its multiple mandates, 
the National Bank of Hungary also adjusts to the international trend, as now it has functions 
similar to the US and British central banks and to the European Central Bank, which has re-
cently become more active in boosting business and in the market of government securities. 
7.  CONCLUSION
Fiscal adjustments can also be made and economic growth revamped by methods other 
than those used in the decade-long (conventional) practice (IMF, EU). 
The monetary policy practice relying on multiple mandates and multiple instruments, de-
veloped by the National Bank of Hungary during the crisis to replace the single goal – single 
instrument (exclusively anti-inflationary) policy, favoured in the European continental area in 
the early phase of the European Union integration, can serve as a model.
Crisis management, whether fiscal or using monetary policy means, brought success in 
Hungary because of the codification of a powerful statutory regulation (at the highest level); 
in other words, budget management was placed on a regulatory footing, and now legal and 
institutional guarantees ensure budget discipline. This restored the government’s ability to 
have control. 
As a prerequisite of successful crisis management, fiscal and monetary mechanisms must 
be coordinated in a way not to jeopardize the central bank’s independence, although the mo-
netary instruments used for crisis management (Funding for Growth and similar schemes) 
cannot last forever.  With the crisis subsiding, market conditions must take over the crisis ma-
naging role of fiscal and monetary policy in the national economy; in other words, subsidies, 
the government’s interventions in the economy and the central bank’s crisis management 
schemes must be replaced by market boosting impetuses. 
An ideal public finance system fundamentally responds to the challenges of the national 
economy, but it cannot remain averse to new international trends either, and cannot rely exc-
lusively on the given country’s economic history and experience. Public finance management 
is based on the proportionate combination of these, properly dimensioned in time and space. 
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Csaba Lentner*
IZVACI O NOVIM MAĐARSKIM DRŽAVNIM FINANCIJAMA S PRAVNOG, 
EKONOMSKOG I MEĐUNARODNOG STAJALIŠTA**
Sažetak
Mađarsko nacionalno gospodarstvo, koje je rješavalo dugove javnih financija, slabu učinkovi-
tost u proračunskoj politici i slab kontrolni potencijal, sredinom 2000-ih zahvatila je kriza koja 
se dodatno produbila 2007. i 2008. godine. Prilagodba proračuna provodi se od 2010. godine, 
unatoč uobičajenoj metodi upravljanja kriznim situacijama Međunarodnog monetarnog fon-
da (MMF) i Europske unije, koja se temeljila na proračunskim ograničenjima. Godine 2013. 
Mađarska središnja banka koja nije koristila konvencionalne instrumente upravljanja krizom, 
postala je institucionalni dio državnog financijskog sustava. Potvrdilo se da središnja banka 
može pomoći fiskalnoj konsolidaciji i potencijalu rasta, i unatoč tome zadržati svoju neovi-
snost. Uspostavljeni su uvjeti – nekonvencionalnih – pravila za fiskalne i monetarne interven-
cije unutar najvišeg nacionalnog regulatornog zakonskog okvira čija se usklađenost osigurava 
zakonodavnim i institucionalnim jamstvima.
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